- Theme O: *Real Estate Finance & Investment* Session: O-3 Time: FRIDAY, 26.JUN.2015 09:00-10:30 Location: Taskisla Room 109
- Has anyone seen my neo-cortex? I'm sure I left it here somewhere.
- Behavioural biases among real estate investment decision makers

In this session we will:

- Identify some important behavioural biases
- Consider these in the context of real estate investment markets
- Suggest ways to reduce the possible impact of this behaviour

Q&A to follow

Thinking fast and slow A framework for understanding our biases

Thinking *Slow*: System 2

Thinking Fast: System 1

Quick, automatic, intuitive Slow, conscious, more and emotional. deductive and logical. Default option for Deliberate effort required information processing. means we often defer to System 1. Slow Quick Intuitive Rational Practical Logical Automatic Deductive **Examples:** Emotional Structured **Examples:** Parking in a narrow space. Detecting hostility in someone's voice. Multiplying several numbers. Judging which object is more distant

Understanding the decisions we make

Knowing how our brains work might make us better investors


Investors are prone to a range of systematic errors and psychological biases.

These decision-making errors help to create inefficiencies in financial markets.

They also help to explain irrational booms and busts like the [] bubble.



We make 'cognitive' errors on a routine basis by using rules of thumb and oversimplifications.



Examples of biases

Self-deception

- Confirmation bias
- Hindsight bias
- Narrative fallacy
- Overconfidence
- Cognitive dissonance
- Information overload
- Illusion of control/ illusion of knowledge
- Hyperbolic discounting

Simplification

- Framing and nudging
- Representativeness
- Gambler's fallacy
- Anchoring
- Loss aversion
- Familiarity and mere exposure effect
- Substitution
- Halo effect

Social

- Herding
- Priming
- Imitation

Let's focus on FIVE key biases and how we can address them



ANCHORING Clinging to an irrelevant piece of information such as a number



SUBSTITUTION If a hard question cannot be answered quickly, an easier related one is found



FRAMING Considering issues based on how they are formulated (framed)



LOSS AVERSION Responding more strongly to losses than to gains



HERDING Doing what everyone else seems to be doing

S Ryan and M Richardson

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ANCHORING

Clinging to an irrelevant piece of information such as a number

| Original data | | |
|---|-----------|------------|
| Property | Frequency | Percentage |
| Property A – Average return / low risk | 4 | 23.5 |
| Property B – Average return / high risk | 0 | 0 |
| Property C – Above average return / moderate risk | 13 | 76.4 |

| New da | ata | | |
|---------|-----|--|--|
| acas ac | ata | | |

| Property choice | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|-----------|------------|
| Property A: 70% probability higher return than property C | 4 | 23.5 |
| Property B: 50% probability higher return than its current return | 1 | 5.8 |
| Property C: 70% probability same return | 1 | 5.8 |
| No, my decision stays the same | 11 | 64.7 |

Example of anchoring: clinging to irrelevant data, failing to adjust



SUBSTITUTION If a hard question cannot be answered quickly, an easier related one is found

Example of a hard question

- What is the true nature of this real estate investment?
- Easier related questions
- Which familiar asset class does it resemble?
- □ How did this property fund perform against its peers recently?

Can lead to misunderstandings about nature of real estate

- It's all about capital values
- Real estate is broadly the same everywhere
- You can buy the market, just like with equity
- **Solution** Good asset allocation is all that matters



FRAMING Considering issues based on how they are formulated (framed)

- ✓ Market participants view decisions through the lens of industry norms
- Data made available shapes how we perceive risk and return
- Consistently use familiar but unhelpful frames of reference with which to position the asset class:
 - 1. Focus on sectors
 - 2. Focus on geographies

"It's kind of amazing what is not measured" – Robert Shiller

✓ Market participants view decisions through the lens of their own career risk and social standing

- 1. Focus on avoiding relative under-performance
- 2. Hugging the peer group (managers) or colleagues (investment committees)

"...it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally" – JM Keynes

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Framing: "data shape" determines our approach

| IP | D | Offic | e | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------|--------------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|------------|------------------|---|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| An MSC | l Brand | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
| TOTAL RETURN (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| London Postal Distri | cts & Postcodes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EC1 | | 13.9 | 0.1 | -0.7 | 3.5 | 12.8 | 23.1 | 40.5 | 34.6 | 19.1 | -15.4 | -18.3 | -6.7 | 17.3 | 9.4 | 5.4 | 8.9 | 17.3 | 13.6 | 16.5 | 21.7 | 10.9 |
| EC2 EC3 | | 16.3 16.3 | 10.2 8.6 | 7.4 5.6 | 8.9 6.5 | 13.6 11.1 | 23.0 18.2 | 42.2 37.0 | 20.5 20.8 | 6.9 4.3 | -14.4 -14.3 | -15.4 -18.9 | -7.2 -5.3 | 16.9 23.4 | 14.7 10.5 | 5.9 5.9 | 9.2 5.7 | 16.2 13.5 | 8.2 8.8 | 8.5 10.8 | 18.1 14.9 | 10.3 10.8 |
| EC4 | | 15.8 | 11.1 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 9.0 | 22.3 | 37.9 | 23.7 | 8.5 | -14.1 | -16.2 | -7.4 | 25.3 | 8.8 | 2.9 | 5.4 | 15.8 | 9.3 | 11.5 | 15.9 | 12.5 |
| WC1 | | 14.4 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 8.9 | 14.8 | 37.5 | 46.9 | 29.1 | -7.0 | -17.6 | -11.3 | 16.9 | 8.6 | -0.2 | 8.2 | 23.7 | 18.3 | 17.6 | 25.0 | 12.4 |
| WC2 | | 15.7 | 3.9 2.5 | 7.4 4.9 | 7.4 | 9.5 12.1 | 13.7 18.4 | 41.8 | 40.5 | 18.0 | -12.3 | -20.2 | -15.7 | 16.1 17.6 | 14.4 | 4.1 | 8.4 | 19.6 17.8 | 12.5 | 14.6 | 21.0 | 8.5 |
| W1 SW1 | 1 | 13.6 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 11.0 | 12.1 | 18.4 | 39.7 | 44.8 | 19.6 | -10.3 | -18.8 | -14.0 | 17.6 | 15.2 | 5.0 | 10.3 | 17.8 | 12.9 | 17.3 | 18.8 | 6.2 |
| South Bank & Fringe Bank/Broad Street Barbican | IPD | IPD UK / | Annual | Proper | ty Dige: | t 2014 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgravia | | All Pro | perty and Se | ectors | | • | Annua | al perf | ormand | e | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bloomsbury Bromley | An MSCI Brand | | | | | | 198 | 31 . | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |) 1 | 991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| Cannon Street/Eastche | ٤ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | All Property and S | antora | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | All Property and 3 | ectors | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Performance Mea | sures | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Index returns exc | luding Tran | sactions | and Deve | elopment | s | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Total Return (% pa | a) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Retail Office Industrial Residential Other All Property | | | | | | 17 15 12 34 8 15 | .0 .1 .7 .6 | 10.4 6.7 5.7 6.9 4.2 7.5 | 12.3 5.5 6.1 11.9 5.9 7.6 | 13.8 6.9 6.0 28.8 5.0 8.8 | 12.7 7.7 3.5 14.3 -7.6 8.3 | 11.7 12.1 9.2 32.0 -4.5 11.3 | 20.8 30.7 25.1 25.7 7.5 26.0 | 24.8 31.1 39.3 27.4 22.9 29.5 | 9.9 16.5 28.7 14.2 13.0 15.4 | -3.5 |) -1 ; ; . | 3.4 10.8 9.1 -7.4 1.1 -3.1 | 3.6 -7.2 1.4 5.2 1.4 -1.6 | 20.7 19.3 21.2 14.0 19.1 20.2 | 12.9 10.7 11.8 15.4 15.8 11.9 |

Why aggregate performance data by geography & sector?



LOSS AVERSION Responding more strongly to losses than to gains




Chart shows magnitude and cyclical nature of the differential pricing strategy of "losers" and "gainers" during the property market cycle of 2001-09

S Ryan and M Richardson

Loss aversion – US findings

- Loss aversion exists in the commercial property market
- Of similar magnitude and impact as in the housing market
- Greater among larger institutions such as funds and REITs
- Behaviour carries through to:
 - Higher transaction prices (on average)
 - Longer time on the market
- The effect of loss aversion behavior varied over cycle
 - Increasing in the early stage of the peak and turning point
 - Collapsing as demand side weakness became apparent



LOSS AVERSION combined with HERDING

Or why some investors sell at exactly the wrong time (using the UK commercial property crisis of 1988-1993 for illustration)


There is some evidence that investors use a rule of three to dealing with losses:

Strike 1: They are prepared to ride out the first correction in the market.

Strike 2: They are pained by the second correction but hold on.

Strike 3: Finally, they capitulate after the third wave of selling pressure.

The irony is that property markets often correct in three downward waves, meaning investors sell at the bottom. <u>Precisely the wrong time</u>. IPD UK Monthly All Property Capital Values Growth - Jan 1987 to June 1993






HERDING Doing what everyone else seems to be doing



Ireland – Initial yield by sector Dec 2004 to Dec 2014




Herding in real estate markets can push up the values of certain assets or sectors to extreme levels, causing bubbles.

Largely on the basis of attractive capital returns (see Anchoring)

Following the crowd can mean <u>buying when</u> <u>prices are high</u> and *selling when prices are low,* also known as 'chasing the market'. This is a poor strategy but widely used in real estate


See recent examples of "prime" assets and long lease strategies...Spain?

- We have looked at five cognitive biases that interfere with rational logic
- Anchoring, framing, loss aversion and substitution fall into category of simplification
- All these can be mitigated by moving to System 2



Possible ways to mitigate the effects






ANCHORING

Model income and capital values separately







Ask yourself: who has shaped the question this way?




HERDING Doing what everyone else seems to be doing



Buy investments when they are lowly valued versus history







Don't run losers to avoid 'taking a loss' - run the winners, cut the losers




If a hard question cannot be answered quickly, an easier related one is found



Convert the question to a calculation, to activate System 2

Moving from System 1 to System 2

- 1. Run MVO exercises, treating income returns and capital returns as separate asset classes
- 2. When assessing risk-return ratios, use the coefficient of variation (risk per unit of return)
- 3. Estimate future cashflows, with particular emphasis on lease events
- 4. List in writing the pros and cons of each choice
- 5. Ignore sector and geographic data formulations ("frames")



S Ryan and M Richardson

The road towards better decisions ten tips for the real estate investor



- 1. I will forget the price I paid for an investment, to mitigate emotional anchors
- 2. I will analyse the income component of total return with particular attention
- 3. I will focus on expected returns, largely ignoring sector and geographic labels
- 4. I will not be seduced by top down asset allocation
- 5. I will strive to reduce my need for social validation, which encourages herding
- 6. I believe that most references to risk are really references to emotion
- 7. I believe that widening yields represent an opportunity rather than a risk
- 8. I will strive to eliminate my myopic loss aversion
- 9. I will resist the temptation to replace hard questions with easy ones
- 10. I will consistently pursue a focused asset selection (not allocation) strategy

<u>Sources</u>

Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman

Loss Aversion and Anchoring in Commercial Real Estate Pricing by Bokhari and Geltner

Heuristic-driven bias in property investment decision-making in South Africa by Cloete, Hall & Lowies

Driving Emotions from your Invesment Process by Tom Howard